Sinn Fein and the DUP trapped in miserable marriage... their sectarian politics won't let them escape

30 Dec

MALACHI O'DOHERTY, Belfast Telegraph, December 30th, 2025

Who wants to stay in power for ever, apart from dictators, kings and would-be kings, the likes of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump?

These are imperial expansionists. Trump is a rampant egotist with the imagination and vanity of a child. Xi wants China to rule the world and Putin has a vision of advancing a historic project to restore a Russian empire.

None of these ambitions or aberrations is evident in the leaders of the political parties which govern Northern Ireland. True, Sinn Fein has a vision of a united Ireland, but it's just going to have to accept the gradualist and uncertain route to that. The revolutionary route is defunct.

Yet both the DUP and Sinn Fein are likely to continue in power for a long time yet. They are bound to each other and the sectarian make-up of Northern Irish politics assures them that the electorate will always be motivated to keep them in power as representatives of community identity, regardless of the quality of government they provide.

They are stuck together as in a tragically fractious arranged marriage, doomed to being unhappy together without the prospect of separation.

And they are also doomed to being responsible for governing the region and to bearing the criticism for how badly that is done. This is an awful, pathetic position to be in.

I don't know how well Michelle O'Neill and Emma Little-Pengelly sleep at night. I imagine they have a lot on their minds.

Do they fret in the night about how to divest themselves of their onerous and perpetual responsibilities?

They shouldn't have to suffer. It is in the natural order of a functioning democracy that parties move in and out of power. And they like it that way.

There is a precedent in recent British political history of a party surrendering power when it didn't have to.

After the 2010 General Election, a coalition was the only form of government attainable. Labour had been in power for 13 years, could not continue to govern alone but could have been bold and imaginative and proposed a coalition with the Tories.

Unthinkable of course? Well, look at how things developed in Ireland. When the only prospect of Fianna Fail and Fine Gael staying in power was to work together, they did it.

Labour leaders waived the prospect for no better reason than that they felt the electorate, not having given them a mandate, was tired of them.

And they were tired too.

It was time for a rest. It is just too exhausting for a party to govern year after year, continually having to come up with new ideas and always taking the blame for the inevitable hardships that arise.

The DUP and Sinn Fein should be hankering for the relief that comes to parties in more normal parliamentary democracies.

The natural democratic cycle of moving in and out of power is good for a party. It enables it to refresh its energies, put past mistakes behind it, build a new team in the front bench, come up with new ideas, play the vision game.

A period in opposition gives a party the freedom to sneer at and attack the party in power, enjoy the indulgence of presenting itself as wiser and better than that lot, and lets it present a package of ideas on how things could be done differently.

Such a party can rebrand itself, reorder its priorities and come back to fight for power again looking novel and vigorous.

When one party has been in power for decades, it looks stale and drab. Two parties tied to each other look doubly insipid.

Governing as long as they have, together, must be exhausting the spirits of the DUP and Sinn Fein. They are paired together in a tedious and irascible marriage that our sectarian structures allow them no escape from.

I think both parties would enjoy an end to power-sharing and a restoration of simple majority rule. They could then pick their own coalition partners, if they wanted to, and govern with far greater power than they have now, or they could build up a far more impressive opposition and take time to reflect on what this region needs and how best to provide it when their chance comes round again.

Of course, to win coalition partners from the middle ground they might have to moderate their constitutional obsessions a little and sound a bit more middling themselves. They would have greater motivation to reach beyond their sectarian base camps.

The alternative is their continuing unhappy marriage. Sinn Fein's only prospect of being free of it will be a united Ireland, which it has no power to deliver. The DUP can't even cling for comfort to that fantasy.

I pity them.

Perhaps a new year can be time for new thinking about how to free these miserable partners from each other.

Slow progress a feature of North’s early power-sharing

FREYA McCLEMENTS, Irish Times, December 30th, 2025

Executive struggled under weight of paperwork and protracted decision-making process

Declassified documents released today by Northern Ireland’s state archive reveal the pressures on a power-sharing government trying to find its feet in the immediate post-conflict period while grappling with issues that remain sticking points today.

“Despite careful planning, we seriously underestimated the impact of devolution across the Department,” was the assessment of the permanent secretary at the Department of Education, Nigel Hamilton, in a letter from March, 2000.

“This was certainly exacerbated by the fact that we had a very high-profile Minister who attracted huge media interest and also interest within the Assembly.”

That high-profile minister was Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, former IRA commander and at the time Minister for Education in the new, devolved parliament at Stormont set up following the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

For the first time, unionists and nationalists were sharing power in Northern Ireland; his appointment, in 1999, was a watershed moment.

The first Sinn Féin minister in the history of the North, McGuinness’s appointment underlined that Northern Ireland not only had a new form of government, but a new political reality. Nationalist ministers were now at the Executive table, and they were there to stay.

But at the Department of Education, civil servants were struggling to keep up with the additional workload. “To be absolutely blunt, we were stretched to the limits,” wrote Hamilton. Other departments were also feeling the pressure. The Department of Regional Development – where the minister was the future first minister, the DUP’s Peter Robinson – was “close to breaking point” at the end of the first 72 days of devolution. That gloomy assessment was reported by its permanent secretary, Ronnie Spence, in February, 2000.

At the Department of Further and Higher Education, under minister Sean Farren of the SDLP, they were “stretched . . . to the limit” wrote Spence’s counterpart, Alan Shannon, the same month.

In a sign of instabilities to come, Stormont had just been suspended for the first time – in this instance, over the IRA’s failure to decommission its weapons – and the civil service used this period to reflect on the lessons learned.

Summarising the feedback from an away day for the newly-created Office of the First and Deputy First Ministers (OFMDFM) in the Hilton Hotel in Templepatrick in May, 2000, private secretary Billy Gamble noted business was “generally slower than under direct rule”. He added that the decision-making process was “more complex and protracted”.

There was “a huge increase in the volume of papers . . . this ‘paper rush’ placed an enormous burden . . . Ministers (and advisers) were of the view that events were ‘ running Ministers’ and that not enough quality time was available for Ministers to think strategically.

“On the legislative front, devolution had brought an increased workload, new areas of work, pressures on timescales, and higher expectations in respect of legislation.”

20 years on Stormont still ill-equipped to govern

He identified challenges which, more than two decades on, still trouble Stormont. They included the delay caused by “the shared nature of the offices of FM and DFM and the requirement for them jointly to approve substantive decisions”. He also made reference to the need for effective communication between, and often within, government departments, the Executive and Assembly.

Another newly-appointed nationalist minister, the deputy first minister and deputy leader of the SDLP Seamus Mallon, had limited sympathy for the civil service. However, he acknowledged OFMDFM “did not have the ‘infrastructure’ to handle the demands on it”.

In a confidential note summarising an interview with Mallon from May, 2000, a civil servant observed he “seemed to be resentful of civil servants in what they put in front of him – poor diary control and not doing enough of the things that he believed he should be doing, eg getting out and about etc“.

He made “adverse comments on the culture of NICS (Northern Ireland Civil Service) and the need to change”. “Civil servants thinks (sic) NI ends ‘at Finaghy Cross Roads’ (on the outskirts of Belfast) – want to go to Coleraine, etc.”

The documents reveal an awareness of the precariousness of power-sharing and of the need to build public support for the new Executive and Assembly, as well as attempts to begin dealing with some of the many problems facing Northern Ireland as it emerged from a 30-year conflict.

These included many unforeseen issues, including, in January 2000, the need to consider, for the first time, the controversial issue of the flying of the Union flag from government buildings.

Eventually referred to the OFMDFM solicitor, he concluded that devolution made it a choice for Belfast, not London – “for individual Ministerial discretion”.

Reading through the piles of newly-released documents, it is striking how many of the challenges which appear and reappear through the papers are all too familiar, from tackling sectarianism to plans for water charges, provision for Irish and Ulster Scots, the construction of the still-unopened Belfast Maternity Hospital, concerns over climate change and pollution, and the pressures on the health service.

“Like all health services across the UK and in the Republic of Ireland . . . Northern Ireland is struggling under the combined effect of increasing demands and public expectation, rising standards of clinical and social care governance and spiralling costs,” the permanent secretary at the Department of Health, DC Gowdy, wrote. It was yet another observation which might just as easily have been written in 2025 as 2005.

From the remove of 20 years, or more, it is both striking and sobering to see how many of these issues remain stubbornly unresolved.

Stormont aware for years farming was to blame for Lough Neagh crisis

SAM MCBRIDE, Belfast Telegraph, December 30th, 2025

... BUT ENCOURAGED MAJOR EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURE DESPITE INCREASED POLLUTION

Stormont officials knew about the chronic pollution of Lough Neagh decades ago — and also knew that it largely stemmed from intensive agriculture, declassified files prove.

A decade before Stormont used public money to encourage an explosion of factory farms, the then Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) knew Northern Ireland already had too many farm animals, one of the documents shows.

Yet in 2014 then Agriculture Minister Michelle O'Neill — with the backing of the entire Executive — would launch the 'Going For Growth' strategy to drastically increase agricultural production, leading to an increase in factory farms and increased manure.

The documents opened today in the Public Record Office in Belfast prove that long before that decision DARD had known there was already too much animal excrement.

After intense public pressure due to the unmissable visual pollution of Lough Neagh, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) now says a key priority is cleaning up the Lough.

But the files show officials knew not only how bad the problem was, but what was causing it, yet only acted in a limited way when under threat of massive EU fines.

An October 2003 meeting of officials was presented with a paper prepared by three DARD scientists.

It set out how in the 1940s agricultural land was considered deficient in phosphorus and so government encouraged farmers to apply the chemical to land to increase productivity, something which continued until the 1970s.

However, they said that went too far, leading to an estimated phosphorus surplus in soils of some 1.3 million tonnes — equivalent to 14.8kg excess phosphorus per hectare.

The scientists estimated “a total of 1,130 tonnes of phosphorus is exported to waterways each year from agriculture”.

‘Worse pollution than airports, quarries and industry put together’

This phosphorus pollution from agriculture was astronomically worse than phosphorus pollution from airports, quarries and industry put together.

They set out how this was pouring into Lough Neagh — where the greatest volume of pollution ended up — as well as into Strangford Lough, Lough Foyle, Belfast Lough, Lough Erne and Carlingford Lough.

The scientists set out how antiquated waste water treatment plants weren't removing most phosphorus from human sewage and also how most 'industrial' phosphorus pollution was linked to agriculture, stemming from abattoirs, creameries and food processing.

They put agriculture as the single greatest source of pollution, accounting for almost half of all phosphorous pollution to waterways.

The terms of reference for an economic appraisal of measures to implement the EU Nitrates Directive admitted that it was being driven by fear of “the imposition of daily fines from around four years from now”.

It said one option was for farmers to “reduce their herd sizes” but if this didn't happen then they would need to double their slurry storage capacity so six months of slurry could be stored, meaning it wouldn't have to be spread during the wettest periods.

It is clear from the files Stormont had known for years about the seriousness of agriculture pollution but admitted it was only acting because of the European Union.

In one paper, DARD officials wrote: “We now find ourselves in a position, common with the Department of the Environment, that compliance with the EC Nitrates Directive is inescapable.”

As far back as 1996 DARD had done a study which found that 22% of farms had slurry storage of less than three months, 36% of farms had poor slurry storage, 5% had slurry tanks which were leaking and 3% had overflowing slurry tanks.

It also found 24% of farm silage silos were leaking.

The reason these problems hadn't been fixed wasn't because they were unknown, but because, in the words of a DARD official, they would require “large capital expenditure by the farming industry”.

Over half of chemical pollution in rivers from agriculture

One official said that about 55% of phosphates and 75% of nitrates in Northern Ireland's waters originated from agricultural land.

As far back as 2002 DARD had a study which showed Lough Erne was “eutrophic” and Lough Neagh was “hypertrophic”. Eutrophication involves the ecological death of rivers and lakes due to pollution destroying their natural balance; hypertrophic water bodies are even more disastrously polluted.

DARD knew that 75% of nitrates entering Lough Neagh came from lowland agriculture and in Lough Erne that figure was even higher at 92%.

The department's scientists also said that for Lough Neagh and Lough Erne, the pollution from towns accounted for less than 10% of the nitrates entering the water while nitrate loss rates from upland agriculture was described as “exceptionally low”, meaning it was intensive lowland agriculture which was crucial.

The scientists said that the volume of nitrates entering Lough Neagh had increased by 72% since 1971 and that correlated incredibly closely to the increased tonnage of nitrogen being used by farmers in that period.

They said: “Early analysis in the DOE/DARD Scientific Report concluded that the extent of the eutrophication problem in Northern Ireland could affect up to 77% of its land area.

Subsequent analysis, as a result of more recent additional studies, would point to a figure of 85.3%.”

In arguing to designate all of Northern Ireland as a problematic area, rather than focusing on the worst areas, DARD said it wanted to “preserve a clean, environmentally-friendly image for Northern Ireland agricultural produce” and avoid “labelling” of areas as “polluted or environmentally blighted”.

A May 2003 meeting of officials was shown a paper which said: “A considerable portion of the soils in Northern Ireland are thought to be already overloaded with phosphate.”

It said that the implication of this for any restrictions on spreading fertiliser or manure “could be significant”.

Setting out the department's findings to date, the paper said “there seems to be a consensus” on several areas, one of which was that “phosphate pollution must be addressed to have significant impact on eutrophication”.

The department admitted that “voluntary codes of practice have been ineffective in controlling agriculture pollution”.

Crucially, it accepted that “limits on nitrate loadings will require stocking densities to be reduced”. Going For Growth did the opposite.

The scientific data was described as “conclusive” for 44% of Northern Ireland, with investigations into another 33% of the area “ongoing”.

Another DARD paper said that “this is a major problem in Northern Ireland's waters”.

Yet despite understanding the scale of the problem, a table set out a ludicrously low figure for how much of Northern Ireland was designated under EU law as a “nitrates vulnerable zone”.

England had designated 55% of its territory; Scotland had designated 13.5%; France designated 54% and Greece had designated 11% — but Northern Ireland designated just 0.1%.

This wasn't because officials were ignorant of the scale of the problem. Elsewhere in the papers they admitted that “the circumstances pertaining in Northern Ireland are different from those in GB in that the problem of eutrophication is more extensive, agriculture plays a more important role in the industrial base, thus requiring more widespread control”.

The designation had impacts on farmers' ability to spread slurry and officials wanted to minimise the scale of the designation.

Stormont's scientists now say that even if all the pollution entering Lough Neagh was to stop immediately, it would take 20 years to recover. Yet the pollution continues to pour in, despite the Executive making it one of its key priorities.

Last year Ms O'Neill said the protection of Lough Neagh was crucial: “We must do everything we can to protect it… I am committed to working to keep the lough safe and sustainable for future generations.”

Deputy First Minister Emma Little-Pengelly — whose party enthusiastically backed Going For Growth — said she was “absolutely committed to taking the necessary action to ensure that we improve the health of the lough and get the balance right between growing our local economy while safeguarding our precious natural environment”.

British officials resisted searches on 1974 bombings

SHANE HICKEY, IRISH TIMES, in London, December 30th, 2025

British civil servants did not want to supply an Irish investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings with specific information as it would take up too much of their resources to search for the material.

Patrick MacEntee SC, who headed a commission of investigation into the 1974 bombings, wrote to the British to ask for details about sightings of particular vehicles and people during the 1970s.

In a letter from the Northern Ireland Office in 2005, associate political director Robert Hannigan said there would be a “high degree of resistance” to doing any searches beyond information that had already been supplied to the Irish side.

“It is unlikely that anyone holds relevant information, but we could not be absolutely certain without carrying out extensive file-searches. The Security Service and the MOD [Ministry of Defence] feel strongly that searches would carry too high a cost in terms of resources,” Mr Hannigan wrote in a letter to Tony Blair’s adviser Jonathan Powell at 10 Downing Street.

“In addition, even if material was uncovered, there might be national security concerns about releasing it.”

The MacEntee commission was set up by the Irish government to look at aspects of the Garda inquiry into the bombings, in which 33 people died. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) later admitted responsibility.

The commission reported in 2007 that there was no evidence to establish any connection between alleged collusion and the winding down of the Garda investigations in 1974.

Previously, the Barron inquiry into the bombings had been supplied with material by the British government. However, Mr Hannigan stated in the letter to Mr Powell that it had refused to supply more information to that inquiry, leading to criticism from the Irish government.

Father of loyalist killed in Maze accused Dublin government of 'selective' justice

RALPH RIEGEL, Belfast Telegraph and Irish Independent, December 30th, 2025

Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was told by the father of murdered loyalist leader Billy Wright that he was “at a loss” to explain why the Irish Government would not agree to meet him, and asked whether it was because he was not a member of the nationalist community.

Secret files released as part of the state papers revealed that David Wright challenged the taoiseach over why Irish officials were willing to meet with the families of solicitors Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson, but had effectively ignored his plight.

Mr Wright accused the Dublin government of adopting a “selective” approach to justice issues in Northern Ireland.

Billy Wright's death on December 27, 1997 shocked British security officials after he was shot by an Irish National Liberation Army gang who had managed to get a handgun smuggled into the Maze Prison.

The killing sparked sectarian violence across Northern Ireland.

Billy Wright was nicknamed 'King Rat' and was a feared loyalist terrorist.

His father campaigned for the full circumstances of his son's death to bemade public.

Mr Wright was convinced his son's killing was arranged, sanctioned and sponsored by the state. He wrote to the taoiseach on March 3, 1999 after an inquest into his son's shooting.

“Last week, [at] an inquest into his death, the jury, in returning their verdict, included the words 'person or persons unknown, unobserved and undetected', indicating quite clearly that parties other than the three men convicted of the murder were actively involved.

“This means that these parties remain undetected at present. As you are no doubt aware, the inquest raised more questions than it answered.

“Serious matters relating to my son's death were brought to light, including a failure by the prison authorities to act on information received before the killing took place. In view of these issues, I am left with no alternative but to continue my campaign for a public inquiry into my son's death.”

Mr Wright sought a personal meeting with the taoiseach.

The next day, Mr Wright wrote to Mr Ahern again, claiming that while he received an acknowledgement of his first letter, there had been “no indication whatsoever as to your willingness or otherwise to meet with me”.

Mr Wright made reference to Mr Ahern having a meeting “at short notice” with Paul Nelson, husband of Rosemary Nelson, a human rights lawyer who was killed by a loyalist car bomb in March 1999.

He also highlighted “recent remarks” made by Mr Ahern in relation to the death of Mr Finucane, another human rights lawyer, who was shot dead in February 1989.

In the letter, which was marked by department officials as “for your urgent attention”, Mr Wright wrote: “I am at a loss to understand why I am not afforded the same courtesy. With reluctance and disappointment, I and my family can only assume it is because we are not part of the nationalist community in this part of Ireland.

“If this is the case, and it would appear so, then the Irish Government is guilty of indulging in selective justice and adopting a discriminatory attitude towards my section of the community.”

In response to Mr Wright's letter, on May 21, 1999, David Feeney from the Office of the Taoiseach said that due to a heavy schedule of commitments, the taoiseach was “unable to accede to your request for a personal meeting”.

However, Mr Feeney wrote that officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs would be available to meet Mr Wright and a family representative.

Public Inquiry

A public inquiry opened in 2005, following a recommendation from Canadian judge Peter Cory, which found there was no state collusion in Billy Wright's death.

Separately, newly-released files show that a group of US senators including Hillary Clinton and John Kerry wrote to then Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2004, urging him to hold a public inquiry into the death of Mr Finucane.

The letter was sent following the completion of a report from the Cory Collusion Inquiry.

Mr Cory had been tasked with conducting an independent inquiry into a number of deaths that occurred during the Troubles, including the Finucane case, the Wright case, the Nelson case and the Robert Hamill case.

Mr Finucane (39) was shot at his home in Belfast by loyalist paramilitaries in front of his wife and children.

On April 1 2004, Mr Cory found that, in Mr Finucane's case, documentary evidence indicated that there were matters of concern that warranted a further and more detailed inquiry.

Several other examinations of the case in the years since found there had been collusion between his killers and security forces.

Following the publication of the Cory reports, public inquiries were announced into the deaths of Wright, Ms Nelson and Mr Hamill, but not Mr Finucane.

Irish government expressed concern over Stakeknife suicide risk in 2003

Document – stamped ‘seen by taoiseach’ – came days after Freddie Scappaticci had been named in several media outlets

CILLIAN SHERLOCK, Irish News, December 30th, 2025

THERE were concerns that Stakeknife – the British Army’s top spy in the Provisional IRA’s internal security unit during the Troubles – was “a danger to himself” in 2003, according to Irish government documents.

The agent has been described as one of the British Army’s most prized assets, bringing them information from within the heart of the Provisional IRA at the height of the Troubles.

The publication of the final Operation Kenova report earlier this month revealed the cultivation and recruitment of the spy, widely reported to have been the now deceased west Belfast man Freddie Scappaticci, started in the late 1970s.

Stakeknife operated as an agent into the early 1990s, and his motivation was described as being “linked to a risk he was facing criminal prosecution” or a “desire for financial gain”.

An earlier report from Kenova found that more lives were probably lost than saved through the operation of Stakeknife, an agent who “committed grotesque, serious crime” including torture and murder.

As part of the annual release of previously confidential government files from the National Archives of Ireland, it has been revealed that there were concerns over a “risk of suicide” around Stakeknife.

That handwritten note was added to a typed report on a phone call between an investigator at the Stevens Inquiry, which examined security forces collusion, and an Irish Department of Foreign Affairs official on May 21, 2003.

The document, stamped “seen by taoiseach”, came days after Mr Scappaticci was named in several media outlets – with the inquiry official seemingly corroborating the reports.

The now deceased Freddie Scappaticci is widely believed to be the IRA agent known as Stakeknife

When asked if the inquiry planned to interview him, the senior Department of Foreign Affairs figure records the response from the Stevens Inquiry investigator that it was “way too early for that”.

Further asked if there were “health and safety concerns” for Stakeknife, the inspector said it was “not our concern” and that “MI5 and the PSNI are presumably looking after him”.

However, it is noted that the agent may have opted not to avail of protection.

The reference to “health and safety concerns” is marked in pen with an asterisk – directing to a handwritten note from a different department official on the bottom of the page, dated May 22, which states “there are concerns that Stakeknife might now also be a danger to himself (risk of suicide)”.

After the publication of the final Kenova report, PSNI Chief Constable Jon Boutcher said Mr Scappaticci remained a critical person of interest at the heart of the investigation, and strong evidence was found implicating him in serious criminality.

Mr Scappaticci was arrested, interviewed under caution, and files on him were submitted to the director of public prosecutions for Northern Ireland.

In 2018, he was convicted in England for possession of extreme pornography. In March 2023, before any prosecution decisions were announced, he died aged 77.

He was never charged with or convicted of any Troubles-related offences, and always denied any wrongdoing or involvement with the security forces.

UK authorities have declined to officially identify Stakeknife, a position described by Mr Boutcher as “untenable and bordering on farce”.

Stormont Executive asked if Queen could ‘command’ flying Union flag over Govt buildings

JONATHAN MCCAMBRIDGE, Irish News, December 30th, 2025

STORMONT ministers received legal advice in 2000 on whether they could be “commanded” by the late Queen Elizabeth to fly the Union flag over government buildings.

The advice to the executive, contained in declassified papers, stated that the flying of the flag was a matter for the “discretion” of individual ministers.

The information is contained in briefing papers for a meeting of ministers of the newly-formed executive in February 2000.

It includes a note from the executive secretariat which said there had been discussion at the previous executive meeting on January 11 about the flying of the Union flag from official buildings.

It followed the issuing of guidance from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in Westminster which laid out the protocol and days the flag should be flown.

The note said the secretariat had taken legal advice on two occasions from the department’s solicitor and invited ministers to “seek to agree an executive policy on this issue”.

The legal advice from Denis McCartney from the departmental solicitors’ office said he had “not been able to find any statutory provision relating to the flying of the Union flag”.

He said research going back to 1927 indicated “it would appear that the flying of the Union flag was regarded as a prerogative matter”.

He added: “There is nothing in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 or the Northern Ireland Act 1998, to suggest that the flying of flags from the buildings of the Northern Ireland administration is other than a transferred matter.”

The advice to the executive, contained in declassified papers in early 2000, stated that the flying of the flag on government buildings was a matter for the “discretion” of individual ministers

The lawyer continued: “I have to say I have doubts on whether the flying of the Union flag is truly a matter the authority for which relies on the prerogative or other executive powers of Her Majesty, exercisable by Northern Ireland departments.

“Any person may fly any flag, including the Union flag, (in which there does not appear to be any ownership) on their property, and a department’s decision to do so may simply be a matter of lawful administration, rather than an exercise of a prerogative or executive power delegated to Ministers and departments under section 23.”

He said: “It is clear that this, as a transferred matter, is for decision of Ministers, rather than a legal imperative by direction of Her Majesty.

“Accordingly, subject to any agreement which may be made in the Executive Committee, the issue of the flying of the Union flag from government buildings is for individual Ministerial discretion.”

He provided further advice on January 25 on whether there existed in the Crown some “residual power by which government departments in Northern Ireland can be commanded by Her Majesty to fly the Union flag”.

He said the regulations from the Department of Culture, Media and Sport “are certainly issued in the language of command of Her Majesty”.

He also said “the list of days for hoisting flags on government buildings is also clearly intended to apply on a UK-wide basis”.

But the lawyer added: “Whatever the status of this command in Great Britain, it is drafted in terms which disregard the constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland.

“The prerogative only exists to the extent that it is not removed or constrained by Parliamentary intervention, and that Parliamentary intervention is now contained in the Northern Ireland Act 1998.”

He concluded: “I have discussed this briefly and informally with Home Office lawyers.

“They agree that, whatever the status of the command on flags in GB, it is without legal authority in Northern Ireland.”

The file also includes a letter from then Department for Social Development minister Nigel Dodds, sent the day before the executive meeting.

He said: “I wish to register in the strongest terms possible my opposition to any Minister who refuses to abide by the Schedule for Days for Hoisting Flags on Government buildings as set out by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.

“This is clearly intended to apply on a UK-wide basis.There should be a consistent policy across all Departments that the national flag will fly from appropriate buildings on the designated days.”

The executive meeting on February 1 was attended by then First Minister David Trimble and Deputy First Minister Seamus Mallon. Minutes from the meeting show the discussion on flying of flags was “deferred”.

Later in the month the powersharing executive was suspended by then Northern Ireland secretary Peter Mandelson due to a lack of progress on IRA decommissioning.

Contacts between McAleese husband and UDA assumed ‘a life of their own’

State files reveal plans to lay on a coach for loyalist golf outing, and a desire to establish contact with ‘military side’ of the UVF

JONATHAN MCCAMBRIDGE, Irish News, December 30th, 2025

Mary McAleese and husband Martin, right, are welcomed to Taughmonagh primary school in September 2005 by loyalist leader Jackie McDonald

CONTACTS between former Irish president Mary McAleese’s husband and UDA leaders in Northern Ireland took on “a life of their own”, a UK government official said in 2003.

Declassified files show that engagements included Martin McAleese laying on a coach for loyalist leaders to attend a golf outing, but they refused it over concerns that it would look “too much like a UDA day-trip”.

A senior civil servant recorded that “there were a few surprises” at the level of contacts but that Dr McAleese was determined to expand the list of his “loyalist friends” to include the UVF.

More than 1,100 official files at the Public Record Office in Belfast have been opened to the public under the 20-year rule.

The majority of the files date from 2004 and 2005 when the Stormont powersharing institutions had collapsed and Northern Ireland was being governed by direct rule ministers from Westminster.

One of the files relates to Dr McAleese’s efforts to bring loyalist paramilitaries in from the margins of the peace process during his wife’s first term as Irish president.

The scale of his contacts are contained in a confidential note written to then British ambassador to Ireland Stewart Eldon from senior official Chris McCabe in September 2003 called “Loyalism and the Irish: Lunch with Martin McAleese”.

Mr McCabe said he had had a “private chat” with Martin McAleese over lunch.

The note said: “Martin McAleese very frank about his contacts with senior Loyalists. Impressive in both their breadth and depth.

“Well aware of the potential pitfalls but so far things have gone remarkably well.

“Determined to press on for as long as possible, expanding the list of his Loyalist ‘friends’ at every opportunity.”

Mr McCabe added: “It allowed us to hear at first hand what Martin has been up to: although we were already aware of much of what he told us, there were a few surprises.”

The note said Dr McAleese had received a letter from the “UDA’s South Belfast Brigadier” Jackie McDonald in February 2003.

It added: “When Martin had checked there would be no political objection to such a personal initiative, the first meeting was set up.

“Since then the meetings seem to have to have taken on a life of their own.”

The note details a list of contacts, including a meeting in Aras an Uachtarain “involving 50 Unionists/Loyalists that focused on cross-community issues”.

It also included “several meetings with the UDA Brigadiers (including a ‘jovial’ Jim Gray) and others during which Jackie McDonald was clearly primus inter pares”.

The note continues: “Social events, including golf outings, in which some or all of the UDA Brigadiers and their associates were involved.

“On one such occasion Martin laid on a coach but the Brigadiers turned it down on the grounds of collective security and because it would look too much like a UDA daytrip.

“Alternative transport in a fleet of mini-buses was agreed; each vehicle was examined for ‘bugs and bombs’ before his guests boarded it!”

The memo said Dr McAleese had “admitted to being a relative innocent abroad” but added he was struck by “the sincerity of all those he had met, and would tend to take them at face value until he knew otherwise”.

The note added: “For our part we commended his initiative and the progress that had been made.

“We said that, given the provenance of some of the characters involved, and the need for transparency, accountability and inter- and intra-community equality, we couldn’t hope to match his activities on this side of the border.

“But this should not impede him, quite the contrary indeed.”

The note was copied to Secretary of State Paul Murphy and other Northern Ireland direct rule ministers.

The note concluded by stating that Dr McAleese was also keen to establish contact with someone on the “military side” of the UVF.

It said: “To ensure that the PUP/UVF were kept on board, he would be dining with the Party’s Chairman, David Rose, and Secretary, Dawn Purvis, later this week.

“He was hopeful that this would lead to direct contact with someone on the military side.

“He also has tentative plans for some sort of dialogue with members of the DUP.”

Contacts between McAleese husband and UDA assumed ‘life of their own’